Abstract
Introduction
The comparative literature on prime ministers (PMs) and the one on Italian prime ministers in particular are conclusive that Italian PMs are generally weak and a number of potential explanations have been offered for this weakness. However, in his second term in government, Silvio Berlusconi has been unusually dominant and his uncommon power offers a challenge to this literature and an interesting case to examine. The paper aims at offering an explanation to why in his second government Berlusconi differs from previous prime ministers of Italy, by studying the case through a theoretical framework for prime ministerial power.
In order to explain prime ministerial power, much of the recent literature on certain constitutional prerogatives, such as the right to dissolve parliament, points to the efficacy of these constitutional devices to allow a prime minister to make policy gains.
While not as wide ranging as in the UK, Spain or Greece, some of these prerogatives are also available to the Italian PM. Other scholars focus instead on the political resources of PMs such as parliamentary majorities. Yet Forza Italia only holds 28.9 per cent of the seats in the Italian parliament, lower than the Christian Democrats (DC) regularly received. Others still point to political culture and the presidentialisation of the PM office for explanations of prime ministerial dominance in policy. 1 Certainly Berlusconi seems to be more presidential, but this may be thought to be a consequence rather than a cause of his dominance.
Consequently, the case of Silvio Berlusconi is puzzling for at least some aspects of the academic literature. Berlusconi, without any major constitutional changes, has managed to achieve a level of power 2 not seen in post-war Italy. Measuring power is obviously difficult. How can Berlusconi be considered to be more powerful? Apart from the opinions of media commentators some of whom call Berlusconi 'King,' 3 we can point to some of his clear policy achievements to argue that he is fundamentally different to his predecessors. Berlusconi has had a number of policy priorities for his government and has been singularly successful in achieving these. His attempts to change laws regarding media control succeeded despite the opposition of the President of the Republic. Berlusconi's attempts to achieve immunity from prosecution were foiled only by the courts, not by politics. He successfully went against widespread public opinion and political opposition to change Italian foreign policy to a much more clearly Atlanticist outlook. In his treatment of political opposition he looks distinctly more like an Aznar than an Andreotti. Berlusconi successfully overcame opposition to accelerate construction of his pet projects-a high-speed train line and other similar public works.
He also pushed through an unprecedented tax amnesty against the advice of economic officials.
We can also point to his longevity in office. Although longevity does not necessarily correlate with power, Italian prime ministers and governments were traditionally shortlived, even after the electoral reforms of 1993. Yet Berlusconi's second government is well into its third year and more significantly has run without any renegotiations of government. His closest competitors in terms of time in office are Craxi and Prodi, who held office for three and a half and two and a half years respectively. However in both these cases the stability of their coalitions was under continued pressure.
Finally, unlike both Craxi and Prodi, Berlusconi seems to be able to act without restraints against his coalition partners and he seems to openly ignore their views on policies. His economic policies in particular are opposed by the Secretary of Alleanza Nazionale, his main coalition partner, yet he is able to proceed with these stances. indicate that he is still fully in charge. One limitation of this study should be mentioned at this point. Berlusconi's term in office is not finished and much could change yet to limit his power. However, it seems incontrovertible that Berlusconi now enjoys a greater degree of policy influence than any of his predecessors. This demonstrates that under the 'right' circumstances an Italian prime minister can be considerably powerful in shaping policy and justifies our approach.
Recent electoral difficulties experienced by
Some commentators, particularly in the Italian press, point to his ownership and control of the media as the reason for this and the political opposition constantly sees the media as central to the enhancement of Berlusconi's position. However, this explanation seems quite unsatisfactory. While control of the media certainly helps Berlusconi 'sell' his message to voters, he had this advantage in his failed government in 1994 as well and it did not lead to the outcomes we see today.
Many of the other variables cited in the literature such as a political culture of presidentialism, his personal style and his experience as an entrepreneur are actually held constant between his two governments. Thus, the case of Berlusconi offers a critical case study with which to analyse the phenomenon of prime ministerial power.
The work on prime ministers generally tends to treat different explanations for variation in power separately. While it has not ignored the possibility that the institutional and the political explanations might interact in some way, no effort has been made to construct an integrated model of PM power. In this paper we use veto player theory to provide an overall theoretical framework within which existing hypotheses can be integrated. With this framework we then look at a new case of prime ministerial power.
The framework is based on veto player theory 4 and takes as one of the main variables in analysing prime ministerial power the number and diversity of veto players in a political system. The greater the number of diverse veto players, such as parties or party factions in a government majority, the greater the difficulty in implementing policy changes. We subsequently look at the agenda setting literature, and specific institutional prerogatives that allow prime ministers to structure the choices of other veto players so as to enable prime ministers' policy preferences prevail.
We argue that the difference between the two Berlusconi-led governments is his present dominance of the Casa delle Libertá (House of Freedoms), which is a function of Berlusconi's personal control of Forza Italia. As Pasquino argues, 'Forza Italia has become a true party' 5 and this allows it to be much less 'sensitive' to his coalition partners. The party's dominance of the alliance allows the PM to act in a much stronger and effective manner. His personal popularity and the weakness of the other parties in the coalition also assist him. While the number of 'veto players' in Italian government has not been dramatically reduced, the threats of other veto players and the likelihood of their using the veto have been reduced. This leads Berlusconi to largely fill the cabinet in the way he wishes, and effectively threaten dismissal against ministers. The recent dismissal of Finance Minisetr Tremonti (allowed to resign for public relations purposes)
further confirms this point. So whereas the government of Italy used to be 'government by ministries', with each party and party faction controlling and running their minister as an independent body, 6 the current reduction in factional politics has reduced the number of 'veto players' and allowed the party leader to assume much more control over government, as demonstrated by the unprecedented take-over for a long period of time of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Berlusconi himself. While this might be a good thing for the co-ordination of Italian government, this might also be dangerous when co-ordination is for the benefit of one man.
Comparative literature and the Italian prime minister
There is a near-universal acceptance of the view that Italian prime ministers have little influence over policy compared to their counterparts in most parliamentary democracies. Hine and Finocchi argue that 'few post-war Italian prime ministers would rank as powerful leaders.' 7 King places the Italian prime minister in the low power category of his taxonomy. 8 Barbieri in describing two ideal types of prime minister, 'Guide' and 'Mediator', argues that the Guide type does not exist in its pure form in Italy. 14 Cassese may seem to disagree slightly with these views and he considers the prime minister to be 'able to assume the necessary powers and to control the necessary jurisdictions in order to give some central direction to the government.' 15 However, he does not argue that the Italian prime minister is powerful, just that he is in a position to coordinate government, and this may lead to his being able to make some policy gains.
Barbieri agrees with this point, arguing that in Italy the PM has 'a high degree of functional flexibility', 16 which means that there is a very ample margin of potential variation in power and that party circumstances or personal characteristics may make Italian prime ministers potentially more powerful than previously thought possible.
Students of countries with 'weak' prime ministers often cite the role of the PM as a mediator. Shinoda, on the Japanese premiership, notes that both the bureaucracy and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are sectional and factionalised. 17 He cites former prime ministerial advisers who see the leadership potential of a prime minister as based on their ability to transcend sectionalism. 18 The reasons given for this lack of power in Italy (and the variation in prime ministerial influence generally) are numerous, and each of the scholars cited above offer some explanations. They can be put into four categories. One centres on the institutional framework: that 'the constitutional and legal powers of the office [of prime minister]
were extremely weak.' 19 The second focuses on party political and electoral resources:
Italian governments are coalitions and even the parties are coalitions of factions. 20 Therefore agreement between these diverse groups becomes difficult. 25 The various arguments will be looked at in more detail before we go on to show how the second Berlusconi premiership is an anomaly to the existing explanations.
Political culture explanations
The political culture arguments need to be probed to a greater extent to test their validity. The contention that Italy is 'a picture of fragmentation' is probably due to the electoral system and to the role political parties play in it rather than some innate fragmentation of Italian political life. If political institutions changed, it is likely that politicians and voters would respond, just as they did after the 1993 reforms.
It was hoped that the new electoral system would change Italian politics to a bipolar moderate two-party/block system that would allow voters a clear choice between alternative governments. 26 This in turn was expected to lead to a strong and stable government. The new system prescribed a majority of seats to be filled in single member districts by plurality, but retained some measure of PR on a regional list vote.
While the changes forced the parties into alliances, the number of parties paradoxically increased, but this is not due to a culture of divisiveness. The problem with the 1993 reforms for those who intended bipolarity is that they did not introduce a system that provided disincentives to smaller parties. Katz goes through many of the reasons how the system retains incentives for small parties to resist mergers, as they have predictably done. 27 Reed provides some evidence from the 1994 and 1996 elections that Duverger's Law is in fact working, and that the party system is moving toward bipolarity at district level. 28 That prime ministers are challenged 'because they can be challenged' risks being a tautology. Prime ministers can be challenged because they are weak. If changes are made to make them strong they will not be challenged. If rules change so as to make it costly to challenge a prime minister, the prime minister becomes strong. The idea that prime ministers are weak because they have always been weak is rather unsatisfying.
Something must have made them weak in the first place and one would therefore expect that the cause of the initial weakness can be changed and the resulting level of power over policy also changed. Political culture, in order to be a useful explanation, must point to certain phenomena that survive despite institutional changes. An example of a case where culture is important might be that in a country that traditionally had strong leaders, strong leaders are retained over the long term despite changes to the institutional arrangements which would be expected to cause a increase in veto players and hence a reduction in the power given to anyone person or group. In this case one would expect that historically Italy was ruled collegially, and that any institutional changes would make no material difference. This is patently not the case.
Koff and Koff's contention that Italians cannot make decisions, as a cultural argument, implies that they have some sort of psychological block about decisions, at least in terms of politics. They provide no evidence for why this may be the case. Alternatively one could argue that decision-making is made difficult by virtue of the fact that power is distributed across many positions and bodies, whose interests do not necessarily overlap. In Lijphart's taxonomy of democracies, Italy falls firmly into the consensus category, where power is distributed to many quarters. 29 
Institutional and new institutional explanations
The Italian constitution distributes political power relatively evenly among different institutions. Italy's local government is strong and power in the parliament is allocated almost symmetrically between the two chambers. At the same time, the President is conferred significant powers. Finally, the government lacks means by which to control parliament in ways that would make parliament as impotent as it is in many other parliamentary democracies. Although 'constitutionally, the role of the Italian PM is defined with no more precision than that of prime ministers in most parliamentary systems', 30 the powers or prerogatives given to prime ministers in Italy do not match those of other countries. While Italian prime ministers can appoint ministers (or rather advise the President to appoint ministers, Article 92.2), they cannot dismiss ministers.
Moreover, unlike in many other parliamentary democracies, Italian prime ministers have no authority to dissolve or instigate the dissolution of the parliament, and cannot call a confidence motion without the agreement of the cabinet. The new institutional literature is convincing in showing why some of these institutional prerogatives might enable a political actor to make policy gains against an unwilling cabinet or parliament.
Huber 31 has shown how the confidence motion allows the prime minister to make the final policy proposal in a debate and to link that proposal with the collapse of the government. In effect, the prime minister can make the following offer: 'either you take my policy or the government collapses.' One can assume that parliament has some value in the continuance of the government; otherwise it would remove it at any stage.
Another possible institutional weakness facing prime ministers vis-à-vis the cabinet is the administrative support they are afforded. The prime minister's office was traditionally small and although its size and responsibilities increased in the 1980s it did 'little to counterbalance the bureaucratic tendencies pulling towards fragmentation along departmental lines.' 32 These resources will give the prime minister the ability to make policy proposals that can compete with a ministry's, and thus can challenge the dominance of the bureaucracy. However, the ability to make proposals, while helpful does not afford one the ability to force decisions. Extra administrative support will be useful to those prime ministers who are already in a strong position to force other actors to accept their will, but may not be helpful to weak leaders.
In any case, the need for a strong prime minister to have a large administrative structure, however, is unclear. The UK prime minister traditionally had a support staff of less than 34 Only since 1990 has the government had any input into the parliamentary agenda. However, although the Camera was independent of government and resistant to government pressure, its power was negative rather than positive. The parliament could rarely agree on any substantive legislation. 35 Usually it just meant that no law could be passed, or if one was passed, this happened slowly. Its ability to resist government pressure was as a result of other features. Many votes in the Camera were by secret ballot. This did not help to curb the natural inclination for parliamentarians to vote as they pleased, because when a vote is secret no promise can be verified nor threat carried out. Since 1988, however, voting by secret ballot has been rare.
According to the empirical literature the Italian prime minister is weak. The theoretical literature suggests that it is because the Italian prime minister lacks the institutional resources afforded to prime ministers in other countries. Yet, even if the institutional resources were available to the prime minister, this may not necessarily make a difference. As Criscitiello points out the Italian prime minister is 'limited by the need for coalition bargaining and by the power of party leaders.' 36 
Political and electoral resource explanations
The realities of electoral and party politics may deny Italian prime ministers control over policy. Italian political leaders have rarely been 'poster boys' for their party, an asset that parties need to win elections and in return someone to whom the parties cede some control over policy. This is where the comparison between Berlusconi II and other
Italian governments begins to differ, as the 2001 election that gave the victory to the Casa delle Libertà was deemed to be a personal victory for Silvio Berlusconi.
Traditionally, the organisation of parties was divided into factions rather than centrally controlled by a single leader or a cohesive group of leaders. Prime ministers in Italy needed to carefully construct coalitions containing many parties and allowing them to control departments in which they have most interest. This was usually as a result of bargaining among the party leaders, of which the designated prime minister may not have been one. It was common for the party leaders to stay out of the cabinet. Thus not only were the names of the ministers not the choice of the prime minister, nor were their positions. Cotta and Verzichelli point out that prime ministers of Italy had little say in who was appointed to cabinet, and if prime ministers appeared to be influential, it was because they were strong within the party rather than because of their position as prime minister.
37
The party hierarchy traditionally had little control over individual MPs. This was because a single party hierarchy did not exist. The Christian Democrats (DC) was marked by extreme factionalism and decentralisation of power. 38 So party leaders had little control over the parliamentarians. Rather, the often-regional factions and their 'sponsors' exerted control over voting in parliament. Thus, the common methods by which party leaders exert pressure on parliamentarians did not exist. Threats against deputies who fell out of line were rarely credible. As prime ministers had no control over hiring and firing ministers, candidate selection and other appointments, they could have little more influence on policy compared to another minister or faction leader.
Even when the political ability exists it is not clear that the constitutional ability exists.
Ministers once hired could resist the pressure of prime ministers, safe in the knowledge they could not be removed. So even PMs who control their party might not be able to do anything to remove a minister unwilling to go.
Venturino argues that the electoral system change has generally made the party leader more central to the political campaign. 39 Single seat constituencies mean that to avoid vote splitting a two block system was set up with identifiable leaders and it is plausible that this could translate to political influence. However there is no reason that these blocks needed single identifiable leaders, and as Alessandra Longo recently argued, Silvio Berlusconi led the way in the process of the personalisation of political leadership in Italy. She points out that 'it was him in 1994 who personalised the political product, no longer would the vote go to a party but to a face, Berlusconi's face. He smiled; he gazed at voters promising miracles.' 40 In any case, unchallenged leadership of a coalition does not guarantee unchallenged control of the government. This is something
Prodi found out to his cost.
An analytical framework of prime ministerial power
We consider that the two factors of institutional architecture and the political or electoral variables are both important issues when considering prime ministerial power.
However, the two should not be treated as separate explanations in competition with each other. Nor should they be thought of as strictly additive-having any one resource is good and having more is better. The framework we set out below builds on both through their interaction. One should start by looking at how many veto players exist in a parliamentary system. Tsebelis defines veto players as 'individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo.'the unanimous agreement of all the veto players. The logic of the model is that if a political system has many diverse veto players, agreement will be more difficult to achieve and hence policy stability (or stagnation) will ensue. Tsebelis shows that if there is only one veto actor, it will be all-powerful (and at one extreme on a power continuum). When two or more exist, it is then important to note whether these veto Veto player theory is silent on whether or how different veto players can convince each other not to use the veto. It tells us whether we should expect policy change to be possible. However at times we see what could be regarded as veto players not using the veto in cases where they would be expected to. The second stage of our framework is relevant to explain the use and non-use of the veto. We argue that agenda setting is relevant to the ability of one veto player to prevail against another.
Schattschneider argued that 'the definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power.' 42 So where one political actor can set the alternative policies/outcomes from which another must choose, the person setting the choice has power and influence over the eventual policy outcome. Romer and Rosenthal have shown the importance of agenda setting in a formal setting. 43 They noted that the status quo is highly important in enabling those with agenda setting rights to change policy toward their preferred position. An 'extreme' status quo position will give an agenda setter more leverage to achieve policy gains. This is why significant policy changes tend to happen at time of national disaster; for example the New Deal in the US occurred during the depression in the 1930s; the UK's NHS was set up in the aftermath of the Second World War.
Within agenda setting as we have broadly conceived it, some prime ministers possess institutional prerogatives, which allow them to set alternatives for others in the policy making process. We look at four; the confidence motion, the right to dissolve parliament, the right to hire and fire ministers and the ability of party leaders to control candidate selection. These prerogatives give prime ministers who possess them the ability to set difficult choices for other veto players, which will make them more likely to accept PMs' wishes. We note how Huber and McCarty show that the prerogative to call a confidence motion can be conducive to prime ministers 'getting their way.' 44 The confidence motion allows prime ministers to link a policy proposal to the survival of the government. Assuming that a majority in parliament values the government's continued existence, the prime minister can use that 'value' to extract policy concessions from the parliament. O'Malley has shown evidence of the correlation between the availability of the confidence motion to a prime minister and prime ministerial power. 45 In Italy, the prime minister has never been the sole veto player. Governments have been coalitions of parties, and the parties have been factionalised. So Italian prime ministers have needed to use their agenda setting powers to direct policy to their benefit.
However, the agenda setting rights of Italian prime ministers are limited, and they cannot use the confidence motion without the agreement of the cabinet. This means the prerogative cannot be used 'against' the cabinet, or government parties as it often is in other countries. Yet the study of 'agenda setting' should not limit itself to formal procedures for structuring an agenda in government or parliament. Sometimes political actors can set the agenda informally by giving choices to other veto players, and the impact of these choices can be just as important to understanding decisions leading to policy outcomes as those decisions brought about through formal agenda setting. campaigned at length, Prodi failed to achieve any significant changes, while
Berlusconi's government has been able to radically overhaul school system amidst great controversy and opposition from teachers' unions and students.
The change of the electoral system from an open list system where the voters had a significant degree of control as to which of a party's candidates got elected to a mixed system has increased the party's control as to who gets elected. This enables party leaders to have more control over their deputies. 49 We have discussed variables in which the Italian prime minister is comparatively weak:
the ability to make a final offer to parliament; to call elections; to appoint and dismiss ministers and to be leader of a majority in parliament. These interact with factors such as government and party popularity to allow a prime minister to define the alternatives from which other veto players must choose. Now we go on to look at evidence that Berlusconi's position in government is stronger, before seeing how his position is different to the traditional Italian prime minister's in these respects (including his earlier government).
Berlusconi's influence on policy
Since coming to political office for the second time, Silvio Berlusconi has certainly seemed a much stronger leader and has been able to exert a substantial amount of influence on policy decisions within his cabinet. As stated in the introduction, 54 The central role played by Forza Italia as the bridge between uneasy allies such as the Northern League (LN) and the National Alliance (AN) and the electoral weakness of these two parties ensure that defections will be highly unlikely during this term. Combined with FI and Berlusconi's electoral popularity, this makes him, as the only major figure within Forza Italia, the only credible veto player within Cabinet. As mentioned earlier, while there are tensions within the majority and within the government, Berlusconi's allies know that on their own they are extremely unlikely to be successful and therefore to be represented in future governments. Unlike his predecessors, Berlusconi has also much more control over the legislative agenda. In a break with tradition, both presidents of the chamber and the senate are an expression of the government majority. Through this, more effective control is exercised. Furthermore, a brief look at the legislation passed since coming to power clearly indicates that priority has been given to laws protecting Berlusconi's 'private interests.' Another area where Berlusconi has become more prominent than usual in terms of PM powers is in relation to the figure of the President of the Italian Republic.
President Ciampi has been to a large extent marginalised despite retaining some important functions and has not been treated with the institutional respect that other PM showed to the figure of president. This stems from the fact that currently the Italian PM is indeed 'presidentialising'.
Conclusion
Berlusconi represents an interesting case for the study of prime ministers and their power, and poses a theoretical challenge for the literature. Italian PMs were traditionally weak institutional figures in terms of their ability to impose their most preferred policy choices on a divided cabinet and an unruly parliament. In fact, far from following the usual pattern, Berlusconi's second term in government shows quite clearly that the Italian PM can be as powerful as his counterparts in the UK, Spain or Greece. Through a combination of electoral and institutional factors, Berlusconi has been able to exercise strong influence in cabinet over policy without wrecking the coalition. This is thanks to the strength of his party, over which he has absolute control, and to the dominance he exercises over his allies because no alternative strategies to get into government are available to them in the absence of Berlusconi himself.
